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Abstract
We propose a model of processing of information in the brain
which has the following distinguishing features: a). It is quantum-
like (QL). The brain uses the quantum rule (given by von Neumann
trace formula) for calculation of averages for psychological functions.
b). Those functions are considered as self-observations of the brain.
c). The QL-representation has the temporal basis. The brain is a
machine transferring time into cognition. d). Any cognitive process
is based on (at least) two time scales: precognitive time scale (which
is very fine) and cognitive time scale (which is essentially coarser).
To couple our model to physiology, behavioral science, and psy-
chology, we consider a number of known fundamental time scales in
the brain. Although the elaboration of those scales was based on
advanced experimental research, there are still many controversial ap-
proaches and results. The temporal structure of the brain functioning
is very complex.
1 Introduction
The idea that the description of brain functioning, cognition, and conscious-
ness could not be reduced to the theory of neural networks and dynamical
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systems (cf. Ashby (1952), Hopfield (1982), Amit (1989), Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen (1991), Strogatz (1994), van Gelder (1995), van Gelder and Port
(1995), Eliasmith (1996)) and that quantum theory may play an important
role in such a description has been discussed in a huge variety of forms, see
e.g. Whitehead (1929, 1933, 1939), Orlov (1982), Healey (1984), Albert and
Loewer (1988, 1992), Lockwood (1989, 1996), Penrose (1989, 1994), Donald
(1990, 1995, 1996), Jibu and Yasue (1992, 1994), Bohm and Hiley (1993),
Stapp (1993), Hameroff (1994, 1998), Loewer (1996), Hiley and Pylkka¨nen
(1997), Deutsch (1997), Barrett (1999), Khrennikov (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2006a), Hiley (2000), Vitiello (2001), Aerts, D. and Aerts S. (2007),
Conte et al. (2007) and literature thereby.
This idea that quantum mechanics might have some consequences for
cognitive science and psychology was discussed at many occasions already
by fathers of quantum theory. We can mention, for example, attempts of
Niels Bohr to apply the quantum principle of complementarity to psychology
(see A. Plotnitsky 2001, 2002, 2007 for discussions). We can also mention the
correspondence between Pauli and Young about analogy between quantum
and mental processes.
During the last 30 years it was done a lot for the realization of the very
ambitious program of quantum reductionism. There were various attempts
to reduce mental processes to quantum physical processes in the brain. Here
we point out to fundamental works Hameroff (1994, 1998) and Penrose (1989,
1994, 2005).
However, the quantum formalism provides essentially more possibilities
for modeling of physical, biological, and social processes. One should distin-
guish quantum mechanics as physical theory and its formalism. In principle,
there is nothing surprising that a formalism which was originally developed
for serving to one special physical theory can be used in other domains of sci-
ence. For example, we are not surprised that differential calculus which was
developed to serve to classical Newtonian mechanics was later used in field
theory, quantum mechanics, biology, economics. Nobody protests against ap-
plying the classical probability calculus (the Kolmogorov measure-theoretic
model) to modeling of financial processes and so on. In the same way one
might import into cognitive science and psychology the mathematical for-
malism of quantum mechanics, even without trying to perform a reduction
of mental processes to quantum physical processes.
To escape misunderstanding, we shall reserve notations classical and
quantum for physics. And in applications outside physics we shall use nota-
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tions classical-like (CL) and quantum-like (QL).
By using non-reductionist QL-models one can escape some fundamental
problems arising in the quantum reductionist approach, e.g., the presence of
the huge gap between the quantum (physical) and neurophysiological scales.
However, the problem of coupling with physical reality could not be just
forgotten. Suppose that the quantum processes in the brain as a physical
system are not responsible for mental phenomena. The natural question
arises: ”What is then the mechanism (physical, chemical, biological) inducing
the QL-rules of mental processing?” In the present paper we shall show that
the temporal structure of the brain functioning could be responsible for the
QL-structure of processing of mental information.
Our starting point is a series of works Khrennikov (2005a, b, 2006b-d)
on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics as a special representation of
classical statistical mechanics. In such an approach the quantum formalism
is merely a way of representation of information about systems (physical as
well as biological). Suppose that we are not able to collect the complete set
of information about a system (e.g., because of some restrictions for measure-
ment procedures and technologies). In such a situation we may, nevertheless,
try to create a model of phenomena which is based on ignorance of a part
of information. By our interpretation the quantum formalism provides the
consistent rules for such a modeling.
In this paper we shall apply methods developed in Khrennikov (2005a, b,
2006b-d) to cognitive science and psychology. We are especially interested
in the following fundamental question: How can such a QL-projection of
information be realized in biological systems?
We propose a model of processing of information in the brain which has
the following distinguishing features:
a). It is quantum-like (QL). The brain uses the quantum rule (given
by von Neumann trace formula) for calculation of averages for psychological
functions.
b). Those functions are considered as self-observations of the brain.
c). The QL-representation has the temporal basis. The brain is a machine
transferring time into cognition.
d). Any cognitive process is based on (at least) two time scales: pre-
cognitive time scale (which is very fine) and cognitive time scale (which is
essentially coarser).
To couple our model to physiology, behavioral science, and psychology,
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we consider a number of known fundamental time scales in the brain. Al-
though the elaboration of those scales was based on advanced experimental
research, there are still many controversial approaches and results. The tem-
poral structure of the brain functioning is very complex. As the physiological
and psychological experimental basis of our QL-model we chosen results of in-
vestigations on one special quantal temporal model of mental processes in the
brain, namely, Taxonomic Quantum Model –TQM, see Geissler et al (1978),
Geissler and Puffe (1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92), Geissler and Kompass
(1999, 2001), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999). The TQM is closely
related with various experimental studies on the temporal structure of men-
tal processes, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978), Kristofferson (1972,
80, 90), Bredenkamp (1993), Teghtsoonian (1971). We also couple our QL-
model with well known experimental studies, see, e.g., Brazier (1970), which
demonstrated that there are well established time scales corresponding to the
alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves; especially important for us are
results of Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005), Buzsaki (2005).
The presence of fine scale structure of firing patterns which was found
in Luczak et al (2007) in experiments which demonstrated self-activation of
neuronal patterns in the brain is extremely supporting for our QL-model.1
Of course, not yet everything is clear in neurophysiological experimental re-
search, see Luczak et al (2007): ”The way spontaneous activity propagates
through cortical populations is currently unclear: while in vivo optical imag-
ing results suggest a random and unstructured process Kerr et al (2005), in
vitro models suggest a more complex picture involving local sequential orga-
nization and/or traveling waves, Cossart et al (2003), Mao (2001), Ikegaya
(2004), Sanchez-Vives and McCormick (2000), Shu, Hasenstaub, and Mc-
Cormick(2003), MacLean (2005).”
In any event our QL-model for brain functioning operates on time scales
which are used in neurophysiology, psychology and behavioral science. This
1”Even in the absence of sensory stimulation, cortex shows complex spontaneous activ-
ity patterns, often consisting of alternating ”DOWN” states of generalized neural silence
and ”UP” states of massive, persistent network activity. To investigate how this sponta-
neous activity propagates through neuronal assemblies in vivo, we recorded simultaneously
from populations of 50-200 cells in neocortical layer V of anesthetized and awake rats. Each
neuron displayed a virtually unique spike pattern during UP states, with diversity seen
amongst both putative pyramidal cells and interneurons, reflecting a complex but stereo-
typically organized sequential spread of activation through local cortical networks. The
timescale of this spread was 100ms, with spike timing precision decaying as UP states
progressed,” see Luczak et al (2007).
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provides an interesting opportunity to connect the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics with theoretical and experimental research in mentioned
domains of biology. We hope that our approach could attract the attention
of neurophysiologists, psychologists and people working in behavioral science
to quantum modeling of the brain functioning. On the other hand, our QL-
model might stimulate theoretical and experimental research on temporal
structures of the brain functioning.
2 Quantum-like processing of incomplete in-
formation
As was pointed out, in this paper we consider not the quantum mechanics
– a special physical theory which is applicable for a special class of physical
systems (so called quantum systems),– but its formalism – a special mathe-
matical formalism for representation of information. The quantum formalism
is a special way of processing of incomplete information. However, if infor-
mation cut off were done occasionally, one would have a chaotic information
picture. The quantum formalism provides a possibility to create a consistent
processing through the information projection. Such a formalism was first
time found in physics at the beginning of 20th century.
Of course, our interpretation of quantum mechanics – as an incomplete
description of quantum systems – contradicts to the original views of Bohr,
Heisenberg, Pauli, von Neumann, Dirac and many others who postulated
that quantum mechanics is a complete theory: the wave function provides
the complete representation of statistical information about a system, e.g.,
electron. However, our “incomplete information processing interpretation”
might be sympathetic for Einstein, Schro¨dinger, De Broglie, Bohm, Mar-
genau, Popper, and nowadays Marshal, Ballentine, De Baere, De Muynck,
Santos, Khrennikov and many others; cf. also with Svozil, 2006.
Even if the first application of processing of incomplete information on
the basis of the quantum formalism was found in physics, there are no funda-
mental reasons to restrict its applications only to physics. We are interested
in applications to cognitive sciences.
One might guess that the ability for the quantum-like (QL) processing
of information was developed by biological organisms. From the very begin-
ning of evolution biological organisms operated with huge information flows.
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They could create a representation of external world which was based on
an information-projection such that cuts of information flows were done in
a consistent way. In the process of evolution there could be developed the
ability to work with information by using the QL-representation.
We start with physics and we consider two time scales Khrennikov (2006d).
One scale, we call it prequantum, is a fine time scale, another, we call it quan-
tum, is a coarser time scale. Oscillations at the prequantum time scale are
averaged and used for probabilistic reasoning at the quantum scale. The
latter time scale is considered as an observational time scale.
It is important to mention that it was shown mathematically that one
can really derive quantum averages as approximations of classical averages
at the prequantum time scale, Khrennikov (2006d).
In the conventional quantum mechanics for physical systems the two time
scale representation has a “semi-subjective character.” On the one hand, the
quantum time scale – the atom time scale in Khrennikov (2006d):
tq ≈ 10
−21sec,
and the prequantum time scale – the Planck time scale in Khrennikov (2006d):
spq ≈ 10
−44sec,
are scales of real physical processes.
On the other hand, the choice of the quantum (observational) scale and,
hence, the concrete application of the quantum representation of information
is a consequence of the presence of a special class of observers – human beings
– and the special level of development of measurement technologies.
We now suppose that a biological system might create the QL-representation
and QL-processing of information which are based on operating at two time
scales.2 There is an analogue of the prequantum time scale. Information
which is processed at that time scale is considered as non-cognitive. Thus
this is a time scale of subconsciousness. We call this time scale precogni-
tive and denote the precognitive time by s and its scale unit by spc. There
is also an analogue of the quantum time scale. One can say that it is the
observational time scale. However, the crucial difference from the conven-
tional quantum mechanics (for physical systems) is that there are no external
2Thus discovery of quantum mechanics for physical systems was simply a rediscovery
of the basic representation of information in the human brain!?
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observers. The brain performs observations on itself. It is better to speak
about self-observational time scale. It is assumed that this is the time scale
of cognition. We call it the cognitive time scale and denote the cognitive time
by t and its scale unit by tc. Of course, we have the inequality:
spc < tc.
The crucial parameter that determines the measure of quantumness (or better
to say QL-ness) of cognition is the parameter:
κ =
spc
tc
. (1)
It provides a numerical measure of deviation of the QL (fuzzy, unsharp)
representation of information from the “classical” (complete, sharp) one.
Under the assumption that the precognitive time scale spc is fixed, we
find that for small periods of fluctuations tc the parameter κ is very large.
Thus higher frequencies (at the cognitive time scale) induce larger deviations
from the (complete) CL-processing of information.
Huge amounts of information which are processed at the precognitive
time scale are neglected, but not arbitrary (randomly). There is the QL-
consistency in the information processing. Consequently, for low frequen-
cies (oscillations with long periods) this coefficient is small. Therefore the
QL-processing does not imply large deviations from the CL-computational
regime.
The crucial problem is to find those biological time scales which induce
the QL-representation of information. There are many ways to create such
time scales. We split the problem into the two parts:
1) to find the precognitive time scale;
2) to find the cognitive time scale.
It seems that (as in physics) the first problem is more complicated. First
we consider the second one. We start the discussion on the choice of the cogni-
tive time scale in by considering experimental evidences, see, e.g., Khrennikov
(2006a) for discussion and references, that a moment in psychological time
correlates with ≈ 100 ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model
the basic assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission
of information over synapses is somehow neglected in the psychological time.
The time (≈ 100 ms) required for the transmission of information from retina
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to the inferiotemporal cortex (IT) through the primary visual cortex (V1)
is mapped to a moment of psychological time. It might be that by using
tc = 100ms, we shall get the right cognitive time scale.
However, the situation is not so simple even for the second problem. There
are experimental evidences that the temporal structure of neural functioning
is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in
V4 (≈ 60 ms) is shorter that the time for the completion of shape analysis in
IT (≈ 100 ms). In particular it is predicted that there will be under certain
conditions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry in time
is one of manifestations of complex level temporal structure of brain.
Our fundamental assumption is that there exist various pairs of scales
inducing various QL-representations of information. In the next section we
shall discuss such a temporal QL-model of cognition in more detail.
We shall come back to the “difficult problem, namely, determination of
the precognitive time scale, in section 5. But at the moment we forget about
physiological and psychological time scales in the brain and we present in
more detail our QL-approach for processing of information.
3 Quantum-like approximation of temporal
statistical averages in brain
There are two time scales, a precognitive time scale spc and a cognitive
time scale tc. There is a cognitive process pi (e.g., a cognitive task) which
is performed at the tc-scale. It integrates a number of processes which are
performed at the spc-scale. Here ”integrate” has the meaning to produce
averages with respect to oscillations at the spc-scale. Such averages are con-
sidered as cognitive quantities at the level of the pi-process.
In our model ”self-observation” is nothing else than the calculation of
an average. However, this is only a part of the story. If the brain were
compute averages by the CL-algorithm – as statistical sums (with respect to
huge ensembles of oscillations at the precognitive time scale) – then it would
be simply an analogue of the ordinary computer. This would be a kind of
”statistical physics thinking.”
In our approach the QL-story of processing of information is in fact the
purely computation story.3 To calculate averages as statistical sums (over
3No quantum mysteries at all. The basic point is evolution for optimization of com-
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huge neuronal ensembles), the brain should consume too much computational
and, hence, physical resources. My guess is that the brain has the ability to
perform calculations of averages by using the rules of quantum mathematical
formalism. Instead of a huge statistical sum, the brain calculates its QL-
approximation given by the von Neumann formula for the quantum average
given by the operator trace, see von Neumann (1955).
A classical mental quantity (psychological function) is given by a function
f(ω)depending on the vector of parameters ω which are produced at the
precognitive time scale. In the QL-algorithm f is approximated by its second
derivative, Khrennikov (2005a,b, 2006b-d). In this way the brain obtains a
symmetric operator A, Hessian of the map f. This is a QL-observable. A
statistical distribution of random oscillations at the precognitive time scale
is represented by its covariance operator. In this way the brain produces
a symmetric positively defined operator. By scaling there is obtained the
operator ρ which has all properties of the von Neumann density operator,
i.e., it also has the unit trace. This is the QL density operator. After this
the brain is ready to find the QL-approximation of the classical statistical
average < f >:
< f >≈ Tr ρA.
We have shown in Khrennikov (2006d) that the classical average, the statis-
tical sum with respect to the random oscillations at the time scale spc, is ap-
proximated by the trace QL-average and the precision of the QL-approximation
is of the magnitude κ which is given by (3). Thus if the parameter κ is very
small the brain does not lose too much information. This is practically the
CL-computation. But if κ is rather large, then the brain works in a nonclassi-
cal regime. One may say (as von Neumann would like) that in such a regime
the brain uses nonclassical logic. Huge amounts of information are perma-
nently neglected. But this does not generate a kind of chaos. Information is
neglected in a consistent way.4
As was pointed out a few times, such a QL-processing of information
save a lot of computational resources. It might be an important factor of the
putational abilities. The QL-computation is quicker, because it is an approximative and
because it does not need so much resources as the CL-computation.
4We have a simple picture of arising nonclassical, in particular, quantum logical struc-
tures. These are systems for processing of incomplete information. The classical logic
would not be violated if we were able to collect and process complete sets of information.
However, sometimes we are not able. Therefore we develop special systems for processing
of incomplete sets of information.
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natural selection of biological organisms.
4 Multiplicity of time scales in brain and quantum-
like cognitive representations
The main lesson from the experimental and theoretical investigations on
the temporal structure of processes in brain is that there are various time
scales. They correspond to (or least they are coupled with) various aspects
of cognition. Therefore we are not able to determine once and for ever the
cognitive time scale tc (“psychological time”). There are few such scales. We
shall discuss some evident possibilities.
Before to go deeper in the temporal structure of mental processes, we
shall analyze in more detail the multi-scale temporal aspects of quantum
mechanics. Such aspects have never been discussed, because, on the one
hand, it was commonly assumed that quantum mechanics is complete (this
is the Copenhagen interpretation), and, on the other hand, the quantum for-
malism is used by only one class of observers – human beings. The latter
generates the unique observational (quantum) time scale. However, we can
consider a possibility that there exits a class of observers (”super-clocks civ-
ilization”) which use a time scale t′q which is essentially finer than our time
scale tq :
t′q << tq
Suppose that the super-clocks civilization has also created the quantum rep-
resentation of information. Of course, their time scale should not be ex-
tremely fine comparing with the prequantum time scale spq :
spq << t
′
q
(we assume that both civilizations – our and super-clocks – are interested
in processes at the same prequantum time scale). The super-clocks civiliza-
tion would discover the same mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics.
But the presence of deviation from prequantum reality would be more evi-
dent with respect to their time scale (since spq is the same, but t
′
q is smaller
than tq, the coefficient κ
′ for the super-clocks civilization is larger than the
coefficient κ for our civilization). On the one hand, the super-clocks civiliza-
tion has a better possibility to find deviations of the incomplete quantum
description from the complete classical description. However, there might be
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chosen a strategy to ignore such deviations and still use the quantum pic-
ture of the world. Even if it does not match precisely with the complete set
of information about external world, it might be, nevertheless, convenient
(by computational and consistency reasons) to proceed with the quantum
pictures of reality.
Similar functioning with a few time scales of observation (in fact, self-
observation) can be present in the brain. How can we find those scales?
It is well known, see, e.g., Brazier (1970), that there are well established
time scales corresponding to the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves.
Let us consider these time scales as different cognitive scales. There is one
technical deviation from the QL-scheme which was discussed above. We
cannot determine precisely definite cognitive times corresponding to these
scales. The scales are defined by ranges of frequencies and hence ranges of
scaling times.
For the alpha waves we choose its upper limit frequency, 12 Hz, and hence
the tc,α ≈ 0.083 sec. For the beta waves we consider (by taking upper bounds
of frequency ranges) three different time scales: 15 Hz, tc,β,low ≈ 0.067 sec. –
low beta waves, 18Hz, tc,β ≈ 0.056 sec. – beta waves, 23 Hz tc,β,high ≈ 0.043
sec. – high beta waves. For gamma waves we take the characteristic frequency
40 Hz and hence the time scale tc,γ ≈ 0.025 sec.
The gamma scale is the finest and hence processes represented at this scale
has the highest degree of QL-ness. On the other hand, we know that gamma
waves patterns in the brain are associated with perception and consciousness.
The beta scale is coarser than the gamma scale and it has less degree of QL-
ness in processing of information. We know that beta states are associated
with normal waking of consciousness.
The theta waves are even less QL than the alpha waves. They are com-
monly found to originate from occipital lobe during periods of relaxation,
with eyes closed but still awake. They are involved into a representation
of information with a high degree of classicality. And these rhythms are
observed during some sleep states, and in states of quiet focus, for exam-
ple, meditation, Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005). However, there are also
experimental evidences that the theta rhythms are very strong in rodent hip-
pocampi and entorhinal cortex during learning and memory retrieval. We
can just speculate that learning needs using of an essentially more detailed
information representation. Thus learning (or at least a part of it) is less
QL and hence more CL. The same we can say about memory retrieval. It
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also needs more complete, CL-representation of information. Large body of
evidence, Buzsaki (2005), indicates that theta-rhythms are used in spatial
learning and navigation. Here we present the same reasons: such tasks are
based on CL-representation of information.
Finally, we consider delta waves. Comparing with the highest scale – the
gamma scale, the delta time scale is extremely rough. This induces a low
degree of QL-ness. This is the state of deep sleep.5
Although we still did not come to the difficult problem, namely, deter-
mination of the precognitive time scale, we can, nevertheless, compare the
degree of QL-ness of various time scales.
Our choice of the precognitive time scale will be motivated by so called
Taxonomic Quantum Model, see Geissler et al (1978), Geissler and Puffe
(1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92), Geissler and Kompass (1999, 2001), Geissler,
Schebera, and Kompass (1999), for representation of cognitive processes in
the brain (which was developed on the basis of the huge experimental research
on time-mind relation, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978), Kristofferson
(1972, 80, 90), Bredenkamp (1993), Teghtsoonian (1971). In the following
section we recall briefly the main features of this model.
5 Taxonomic quantum model
There could be presented a portion of good criticism against starting from
EEG bands. Indeed, this band structure is one of the few indications that
directly point to behaviorally relevant physiological properties. Physiologists
suggesting the definitions had a good intuition. However, that these defi-
nitions depend on behavioral information is shown by enormous individual
differences in the band structures that can be defined only on a behavioral
basis. To some degree this concerns also the general band structure. Because
of individual differences, alpha is often restricted to the common range which
is too short to be theoretically fully relevant. Definitions often go only from
9 to 12 Hz. Most careful investigators (earliest Livanov) defined the band by
the range 7.5 to 13.5 Hz.
Therefore we propose to start with Taxonomic Quantum Model (TQM),
Geissler et al (1978), Geissler and Puffe (1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92),
Geissler and Kompass (1999, 2001), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999).
5The phenomena of sleep and dreaming are extremely complicated. We do not plan to
study them in this paper.
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Why do we propose to use TQM for start of theory instead of, say, some char-
acteristic physiological parameters such as neuronal refractoriness, transmis-
sion times, coupling strength etc.? In my view, the reason is that the only
basis for interpreting physiological facts of brain processes are psychophysical
(behavioral) observations, either based on motor reactions of conscious beings
or verbal reports on conscious events. This was the main way of thinking of
von Bekesy (1936). Of course, many of the functional statements of physi-
ologists have the same basis. For our purpose, this statement is absolutely
essential, because a coherent account of temporal properties of brain activity
must not only be related to behavioral observations, but it must be based
on temporal invariants extracted by a coherent theoretical account of behav-
ioral observations, and only these can provide the guideline to find the proper
physiological correspondences.
The best short cut to the approach is through the history of its emer-
gence: The first impulse towards a taxonomic turn arose in the early 1970s
from the discontent of Geissler, see, e.g., Geissler et al (1978), with the fact
that in simple psychophysical tasks data could indistinguishably be fitted
to models resorting to widely differing, often enough even contradicting, as-
sumptions. In his research in visual recognition, to circumvent this difficulty,
Geissler introduced a technique of chronometric cross-task comparison. The
main idea was to disambiguate models by temporal parametrization, thereby
postulating invariance of time parameters under variation of stimulus param-
eters and task constraints (see e.g. Geissler et al. (1978) and Geissler and
Puffe (1982)). At that time another research group at the same institute
did something similar by fitting latencies in standardized reasoning tasks to
predicted numbers of operations, e.g., Klix and van der Meer (1978). The
estimates from the two lines of studies yielded a surprising picture: There
seemed to exist small bands of operation times centering at around 55, 110
and 220 ms, thus exhibiting near-doubling relations. As a datum from the
literature which fitted into this regularity the asymptotic value of 36.5 ms
determined by Kristofferson (1972), see also Kristofferson (1980, 90), came
to mind which up to the first decimal is 1/3 of 110 ms. Taken together,
these four values suggested a system of magic numbers. Herein a period of
110 ms represents something like a prototype duration from which the rest
of periods derives by either integer division or multiplication. From various
fit procedures for step lengths, Buffart and Geissler came up with an largest
common denominator (l.c.d.) of 9.13 ms (see Geissler, 1985) showing a stan-
dard deviation of 0.86 ms across individuals. It turned out that the four
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above-mentioned periods, although partly many times larger than this small
period, can be represented as integer multiples of it, with nearly absolute pre-
cision: 4× 9.13 = 36.5; 6× 9.13 = 54.8; 12× 9.13 = 109.6; 24× 9.13 = 219.1.
Of course, this might have been some strange coincidence. Yet, later, chrono-
metric analysis seemed to support a modular unit of some 9 ms (see Geissler
(1985); Puffe (1990); Bredenkamp (1993). Further investigations justify a
modified assumption about quantal graining:
Regression yields the largest common denominator (l.c.d.) 4.6 ms, which
is nearly exactly one half of 9.13 ms.
Note that, in terms of hypothetical quanta, a period of such duration
represents the next smaller candidate of a true elementary time quantum
which is compatible with the recognition data. In the following, let us adopt
provisionally the (ideal) value of
Q0 = 4.565ms
for this time quantum hypothesis.
The solution TQM offers to these seeming contradictions, see Geissler
(1987, 92, 85) can be considered as a generalization or at least an analogue
of the psychophysical principle of relative-range constancy. According to
Teghtsoonian (1971), this principle expresses itself in the fact that for all
sensory continua, in terms of output magnitudes, the ratio of the largest to
the smallest quantity is a constant of around 30. About the same value is
obtained from the so-called Subjective Weber Law.
The generalization of the principle in the realm of quantal timing is the
quantal-range constraint. To see how this analogue reads, consider first the
assumed smallest period Q0. For integer multiples n× Q0, consistency with
the relative range constraint implies n ≤ M, with M being a constant of
the hypothetical value 30. It follows that periods of durations in excess
of 30 × Q0 ≈ 137 ms cannot be represented within this smallest possible
range. To account for such periods, we have to assume larger ranges with
correspondingly larger admissible smallest quantal periods to be operative.
To retain consistency with the time quantum assumption, these periods must
be integer multiples of Q0 or, formally,
Qq = q ×Q0 (2)
with integer q must hold. Thus, in general, the maximum extension of any
quantal of periods Ti belonging to it is given by q × Q0 ≤ Ti ≤ M × q ×
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Q0. Note that the lower bound q × Q0 also defines the smallest possible
distance between admissible periods within a range. For this reason we will
speak of it as the quantal resolution within a given range. Of course, in
the actual development, this abstract definition resulted from a variety of
empirical relationships suggesting a range ordering of quantal periods with
upper bounds maximally at 30 times the value of quantal resolution.
TQM does not exclude the possibility that there can be found smaller
characteristic time scales, e.g., Q0/30.
6 Precognitive time scale
We choose Q0 as the unit of the precognitive time:
spc = Q0 = 4.6ms (3)
This corresponds to frequencies ≈ 220 Hz. Under such an assumption about
the precognitive scale we can find the measure of QL-ness for different EEG
bands. For the alpha scale, we have
κα =
Q0
tc,α
≈ 0.055.
For the beta scales, we have:
κc,β,low =
Q0
tc,β,low
≈ 0.069; κc,β =
Q0
tc,β
≈ 0.082; κc,β,high =
Q0
tc,β,high
≈ 0.107.
For the gamma scale we have:
κγ =
Q0
tc,γ
≈ 1.84.
Thus QL-ness of processing of information increases. “Thinking through the
alpha waves” is more likely processing of information by ordinary computer.
Not so much information is neglected. Therefore the information processing
is not so tricky: there is no need to manipulate with extremely incomplete
information in the consistent way. “Thinking through the gamma waves” is
similar to processing of information by an analogue of quantum computer
– QL-computer, see Khrennikov (2006a). Such an information processing
is very tricky: permanent informational cuts, but in the consistent QL-way.
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Finally, we come to the theta and delta scales. For the theta scale tc,θ = 0.125
sec. Thus
κθ =
Q0
tc,θ
≈ 0.037.
And for the delta scale tc,δ = 0.5 sec and hence:
κδ =
Q0
tc,δ
≈ 0.009.
Here the difference between the biological QL-processing of information in
the brain and the CL-processing (as in models of artificial intelligence) is
practically negligible.
We now compare our QL-scales of time with the ”quantum scales” which
were chosen in Khrennikov (2006d):
spc ≈ 10
−3 sec, spq ≈ 10
−44 sec. (4)
tc = 30Q0 ≈ 10
−1 sec, tq ≈ 10
−21 sec. (5)
Thus our model is based on macroscopic time scales, in the opposition to
really quantum reductionist models.
If we follow TQM in more detail then we should consider a possibility
that in the brain there exist a hierarchy of precognitive times, i.e., the above
model with one fixed precognitive time given by (3) was oversimplified. From
the point of view of TQM each Qq given by (2) could serve as the basis of
a precognitive time scale. We obtain a picture of extremely complex QL-
processing of information in the brain which is based of the huge multiplicity
of various precognitive/cognitive scales.
In this framework the notion “precognitive” loses its absolute meaning.
The notions “precognitive”/“cognitive” become relative with respect to a
concrete psychological function (cognitive task). Moreover, a time scale
which is precognitive for one psychological function can be at the same time
cognitive for another.
But the crucial point is that the same cognitive time scale, say tc, can
have a number of different precognitive scales:
Qq1 ≤ ... ≤ Qqm.
Each pair of scales
(Qq1, tc), ..., (Qqm , tc)
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induces its own QL-representation of information. Therefore the same tc-
rhythm can be involved in the performance of a few different psychological
functions.
The final message from TQM is that the cognitive time tc scale should
be based on an integer multiplier of the time quant Q0 :
tc = NQ0. (6)
In such a model we can totally escape coupling with directly defined different
EEG bands, alpha, beta, gamma,... We shall use only behaviorally defined
time scales. The Weber law gives us the restriction to the value of the
multiplier: N ≤ 30.
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